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Introduction 
In 1945-51 Australian Military Courts convened 300 trials of Japanese accused of committing 
various war crimes during World War II, which sat in Morotai, Wewak, Labuan, Darwin, 
Rabaul, Singapore, Hong Kong and Manus Island. The military courts were creatures of statute 
under the War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth) and akin to field general courts-martial;1 as such, they 
were exercising executive, not judicial, power. Significantly, the military courts had no duty to 
produce written reasons for decisions.2 It is the lack of written decisions that elevates the trial 
proceedings – tens of thousands of pages of forms, transcripts and exhibits that were created 
during the trials – to a position of unusual importance as legal records. Moreover, there was 
some recognition at the time that the proceedings had worth beyond legal records; they formed 
a body of historical records relating to the war in their own right and merit and with national, 
if not international, significance. The proceedings contain thousands of accounts of war crimes 
perpetrators, victims and witnesses, as well as firsthand accounts of military service, 
movements, battles, capture by the enemy and, inevitably, atrocities. In seeking to gain copies 
of the proceedings, the Australian War Memorial asserted in 1946, for example, that they would 
be of ‘great value to the official historians, and later to other historians and students of the 
Second World War’.3 However, the Department of the Army, which had had responsibility for 
the trials, simply treated the proceedings as it would those of courts-martial. The proceedings 
were regarded as classified and confidential Commonwealth legal-administrative records that 
were shuffled between government departments and eventually archived but were closed to 
public access for the next quarter of a century. 
 Australia’s tight control of its trial proceedings in the post-war was not unusual for 
government records in this period. This was due to both the absence of an independent archive 
and the tendency to regard archiving as an economically effective means for the storage and 
disposal of records, rather than as the creation of a valuable national repository to preserve and 
make information accessible. However, given the obvious personal and international character 
of the trial proceedings and associated war crimes records, the closure raises questions about 
access to information for those prosecuted and their country. Australia provided only a ‘bare 
minimum’4 of information to Japan about the trials, mostly concerning the identities of the 
convicted and their sentences. The Japanese Government thus made several diplomatic 
requests to Australia in the 1950s and 1960s for access to or copies of the trial proceedings and 
other war crimes records. Other Allied nations were receiving similar Japanese requests for 
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their war crimes records. The consequent Allied consultation was fairly rudimentary but 
demonstrated that a consensus approach to the requests was thought necessary.  
 These processes revealed that, in the decades after the war, Allied nations were generally 
opposed to making their war crimes records available, although some countries were slightly 
more permissive than others. In Australia, the issue of granting Japanese access to records was 
typically regarded as one of ‘policy and practicability, rather than of law’.5 There was no legal 
requirement to provide the trial proceedings even to those who had been prosecuted, let alone 
to Japan. Citing policy and practicability, the Departments of External Affairs and the Army 
thus refused to release the records for decades. The policy reasons for access refusal usually 
turned on what was seen as Australia’s right and obligation to control the dissemination of 
sensitive ‘national’ information that Japan might use to criticise the trials. Moreover, the 
estimated expenses in time and money to make copies of these records was used to argue that 
their provision was impracticable. Little consideration in this decision-making process was 
given to those who may have had a valid interest in access to the records or of the light that the 
records may have shed on a key part of wartime history. The closure of the records simply 
ensured that Australia maintained an exclusive grip on knowledge of that history.  
 Drawing on government correspondence, this chapter examines the post-war views and 
control of Australia’s archives of war crimes records in response to the Japanese requests for 
access. This story will be told through short vignettes that describe the shifting relationships 
between Australia and Japan, as much as those between the institutions of the Australian 
Government and their conceptualisation and approach to the value and materiality of war 
records. This story demonstrates how records which documented the prosecution and 
punishment of people from another nation during legal processes that were open to the public 
to watch (prima facie court records) can, nonetheless, be classified afterwards as confidential 
national records (not court records) of such significant international political consequence that 
they had to be zealously protected for decades. Although Prime Minister John Gorton 
announced the accelerated release of general World War II records in 1971,6 it took until 1975 
for the trial proceedings to be opened to the public. In an interesting turn of fate, it was the 
Commonwealth’s legal executive – the Attorney-General’s Department – that finally 
recognised the importance to history of allowing public access to the records, an importance 
which overrode any supposed protective requirements, such as confidentiality. The ‘past’, 
stated Attorney-General, Keppel Enderby QC, ‘should be everyone’s property.’7 Yet, the 
lengthy delay in making the records accessible meant that, in the interim, most individuals 
involved in the trials had died, taking with them what could have been invaluable personal 
accounts and permanently impacting on our understanding of the trials and the histories that 
can be told of them. In hampering research for so long, protectionism had, in this case, an 
indelible effect on knowledge.  
The First Japanese Request for Access in 1955  
Japan’s first request to the Department of External Affairs for records relating to Japanese war 
criminals and their trials arrived in 1955, four years after the final trial on Manus Island. A 
Japanese Embassy official asked in person for information about the whereabouts of the records 
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and what authority was in charge of them; whether there were extra copies of these records; 
and whether Australia would consent to Japan obtaining these copies. Given that the official 
also enquired about the estimated cost of reproducing the records, it was perhaps contemplated 
that Japan would pay an appropriate fee.8  
 As the Army had convened the trials, External Affairs forwarded the Japanese request to 
the Department of the Army for its view.9 The Secretary of the Department of the Army was 
surprised that a ‘request of such magnitude’ had been made orally. He advised that it seemed 
‘almost certain that the information is wanted for propaganda purposes as no other possible 
reason can be visualised’. He observed that ‘[p]ublication of distorted versions of particular 
trials, extracts therefrom taken out of context, or half truths’ might assist the various nationalist 
organisations that had since sprung up in Japan which sought, for example, to ‘restore the lost 
honour of the Imperial armed forces’ and to ‘correct the cruel injustices done to their dignity 
and memory’. He pointed out that there was nothing in the War Crimes Act 1945 or its 
regulations that provided for copies of the proceedings to be made available and nor were there 
extra copies. He estimated that it would cost £13,000 and ‘20 typist years’ to retype about 
75,000 pages of records or £38,500 and ‘185 machine days’ to do photostatic reproductions 
and his departmental staffing was insufficient to undertake such a ‘tremendous’ task. For all 
these reasons, he recommended that no records should be made available to the Japanese.10 
  External Affairs considered the Army’s response and canvassed a number of high level 
departmental officials. James Plimsoll, then Assistant Secretary, for instance, recommended 
that Japan should be told that it was not possible to provide any records and that no information 
should be provided at all, apart from the Army’s estimated cost of reproduction.11 In due course, 
the Japanese Embassy was told that that none of the information requested could be made 
available. The Embassy apparently made ‘no comment’ on the refusal.12  
 After Australia’s refusal was communicated to Japan, External Affairs informed its 
diplomatic representatives in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, 
the Philippines about the request and the refusal. The representatives were asked to ascertain 
whether Japan had made similar requests to those nations; if so, what that government’s 
response had been; and if there were any ‘views’ was to what was ‘behind’ the request. The 
Australian Embassy in Tokyo was similarly asked to ‘shed’ any ‘light’ on what had prompted 
the request.13 The Embassy responded that ‘[n]othing specific’ had suggested itself as the 
‘immediate cause’ of the request but that it seemed ‘likely’ that the records were sought to give 
‘further support for appeals for clemency’.14 Most of the other Allied Powers had, in fact, 
received Japanese requests for access to or copies of their records of war crimes trials. The 
cautionary responses were fairly similar in each case, demonstrating scepticism of the Japanese 
motives. As a result, the requests were met usually with outright refusals or with limited access 
being offered with such stringent conditions and/or high costs to be met by Japan that such 
offers were not taken up. The United States, for example, had received a Japanese request for 
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records but the State Department could ‘only guess’ what the reason for it might be, as none 
had been provided.15  State Department officials suggested to the Australian Embassy that the 
Japanese ‘might wish to use parts of the records … to support requests for the release of 
prisoners’ or, alternatively, that the Japanese ‘simply’ wanted ‘all records concerning important 
matters in which its nationals have been or may be concerned’.16 One of these officials, legal 
expert George Hagan, referred to:  
 
the common Japanese feeling that the war criminal trials constituted a kind of national 
disgrace and the Japanese desire to ‘expunge them’, as it were, from the record: possession 
of the official documents might help them in some way for this purpose.17  
 
The State Department told the Australian Embassy in early 1956 that the Japanese Embassy 
was going to be informed that the records were ‘not available’, since they were still being used 
by the US Clemency and Parole Board relating to war criminals. Moreover, ‘[s]ome form of 
words will be found’ to ‘discourage the Japanese from renewing their application’, even after 
the war criminals had been all released.18 As External Affairs later characterised the overall 
outcome of the Japanese requests to the Allied Powers, ‘[i]n effect, the Japanese got no change 
from anybody’.19  
The Second Japanese Request for Access in 1959  
The second, quite similar, Japanese request for copies of Australian records arrived in August 
1959. The Japanese Embassy advised that Ministry of Justice was ‘engaged in collecting’ all 
post-war trial records.20 Indeed, the Ministry had established a Judiciary and Legislation 
Investigation Bureau (shihō hōsei chōsabu) in May 1958, tasked with the project to collect as 
many Allied trial records as possible.21 One External Affairs analyst was initially minded to 
reject the request outright, as Japan had provided ‘even fewer reasons for the request now that 
they did in 1955, when we rejected it’ and that the reasons for the rejection remained valid.22 
The analyst posited that the request was based on the fact that ‘there is, in Japan, pressure to 
“correct” the verdicts of Allied Military Tribunals’.23 The analyst also suggested that if none 
of the above was sufficient to explain a rejection, Japan could be told that it was based on ‘the 
need to protect individuals who had supplied information about war crimes’.24 The Legal and 
Treaty Division of External Affairs also advised that there was ‘no obligation in law’ to comply 
with the request and, in fact, no specific legislative provision under which the records could be 
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provided.25 This lack did not, however, prevent the handing over of copies to Japan, if this was 
the policy decision that was made.26 The Department of the Army agreed that the objections 
raised in 1955 remained ‘sufficient’ to refuse the request and, if any further reason was 
required, it was the ongoing Allied opposition to providing access. The Army suggested that 
the Japanese Embassy simply ‘be informed that it is not the practice of Australia to pass 
documents of this nature to a foreign Government or to provide copies of them’.27 
 This time, External Affairs began international consultation while consideration was 
ongoing.28 The United States advised that another Japanese request had arrived in mid-1959, 
for the stated reason that Japan wanted the records ‘for the purpose of historical record’. A 
State Department official suggested to an Australian official that if Japan gained the records, 
however, it ‘might in the future attempt to cast doubt on the trials’ and that ‘this was the real 
motivation’ in seeking them. The State Department intended to ‘stall the Japanese request 
indefinitely by long drawn-out consultation’ with other government agencies. The only 
‘difficulty’ was that ‘some’ proceedings had already been reproduced for university libraries. 
The State Department expected, therefore, that it might have to permit Japan to have copies of 
those trials, although it was likely that access would be refused to investigation files.29 Of the 
other Allied countries, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France had also received 
Japanese requests but were generally not cooperative. France had, however, provided to Japan 
a list of the numbers and dates of the judgments of thirty-four Japanese war criminals and 
advised that it would provide copies only of judgments if Japan paid the expense of doing so.30 
 After receiving the international responses, External Affairs continued to debate the 
matter. One official suggested that it would ‘close the matter out to refuse the Japanese request’, 
which he favoured.31 Another official felt ‘strongly that we should not yield an inch on the 
subject of war criminals’, given that ‘Japan’s record in this field was disgusting’ and that it 
would be ‘abhorrent to the Australian people if it became known that we even discussed this 
subject with the Japanese’. Moreover, this official suggested that Japan be told that ‘we would 
not welcome any further approaches on this subject’.32 Another official agreed with this latter 
view, pointing out in particular that ‘we have already done a lot of yielding’ on war criminal 
issues.33  
 The Australian Embassy in Tokyo was warned in advance that the Japanese request 
would be refused and was advised that the grounds for the refusal included Australia’s ‘feeling 
that we have gone far enough in meeting other Japanese requests on such matters as remission 
of sentences of war criminals’.34 On 19 December 1960, Assistant Secretary D.W. McNicol 
advised Mr Yoshida, the Counsellor at the Japanese Embassy, that:  
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The Department wishes to inform the Embassy that it is not the practice of the Australian 
Government to make available information relating to documents of this nature and it is 
therefore unable to meet the Embassy’s request.35  
 
McNicol told Yoshida that it was in Japan’s interests that memories of war crimes – which had 
‘deeply shocked and angered the Australian people’ – be ‘erased’ and that the ‘chances that 
time would diminish the memories would be improved if one was not reminded of these 
crimes’.36 McNicol added, on a personal level, that it would be ‘preferable’ if the Japanese 
Ministry concerned was ‘persuaded not to raise the subject of war crimes again’.37 Yoshida 
said that he was ‘grateful’ for the reply and ‘understood’.38  
 After Australia’s refusal, the United States surprised Australia in May 1961 with the 
information that it proposed to tell Japan that copies of its trial records (not its investigation 
records, which remained classified) could be made available at Japan’s expense. The reasoning 
behind this abrupt change in position was that as Japanese had participated in the trials, they 
could be ‘assumed to have their own rudimentary records’ of them. In addition, records had 
already been partially made available in the United States. The State Department had also 
concluded that request arose from ‘Japanese Bibliophile-type psychology and their passion for 
completeness’. While the State Department continued to ‘bear in mind’ the possibility that 
Japan might want the records to ‘enable’ the casting of doubt on the trials and to ‘attempt to 
rewrite history’, Japan was already in a position to do this. Australia, the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands were therefore invited to give their views to determine whether an ‘agreed 
policy could be worked out’, so as to ‘avoid’ Japan using the United States’ position to ‘bring 
pressure to bear on the others’.39   
 External Affairs forwarded the United States’ proposal to the Army, which repeated its 
opinion that Japan should be refused access.40 The Australian Embassy in Washington was 
advised in December 1960 that Australia was adhering to its refusal and hoped that the United 
States would ‘not act unilaterally’, given that there were ‘advantages’ to ‘maintaining a united 
front on this issue’.41 External Affairs in London passed along the comment that the United 
States’ proposal had led a senior Foreign Office official to refer ‘unkindly to the “double-
crossing” attitude of the Americans’.42 External Affairs later assumed that it was continued 
Australian and United Kingdom opposition which led the United States to reconsider its plan 
to provide its trial records to Japan.43 Instead, the United States released a policy directive on 
war crimes records in March 1963, which stated the details of the trial records that could be 
made available to American citizens upon application; the trial records were not, however, 
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available to Japan or Japanese citizens. Moreover, apart from official purposes, war crimes 
investigation records were ‘closed to all persons’.44  
The Third Japanese Request for Access in 1965  
That the Japanese had not been discouraged by lengthy delays in responding to the requests for 
war crimes records, the repeated firm refusals to provide the records, as well as the advice to 
desist from requesting them, was made clear in April 1965, when another request arrived via 
the Japanese Embassy. The request came with strong reassurances about the purposes for which 
Japan wanted the copies and the conditions it was willing to abide by to receive them. The 
Ministry of Justice explained that it was collecting ‘all available material concerning war trials’ 
to facilitate research on the factors such as the social system that ‘contributed to war crimes’, 
the ‘legal aspects of the prosecutions’ and the ‘procedural rules’, which it was convinced would 
‘contribute to the development of international law and to the prevention of war’. The Ministry 
reassured Australia that it had ‘no intention of repudiating the war trials themselves’ and 
advised that any copies would be held at the Ministry and ‘made available only to those scholars 
who can make good use of them for a purely academic purpose’.45   
 An initial External Affairs analysis of the Japanese request concluded that the ‘reasons 
advanced by the Japanese’ were ‘not very compelling’.46 It was therefore suggested that the 
request be refused with the same terse statement that had been given five years earlier.47 
However, the usual consultation with the Department of the Army revealed that while the Army 
maintained its opinion that the records should not be provided, it conceded that it was ‘now 
twenty years since the war’ and that it would be ‘increasingly difficult to sustain this attitude 
as time goes on’.48 Change also appeared to be in the air at External Affairs: Malcolm Booker, 
a senior official and former ambassador, suggested in October 1965 that the department should 
take ‘a fresh look at our negative attitude’ and ‘ease up a bit’. In his view, Australia’s approach 
had become ‘anachronistic’ and, he alleged, out-of-step with that of the United States, which 
was ‘prepared to make open to the study of all persons [sic] trial records, transcripts, documents 
and other evidence presented in court’.49 Unfortunately, this was a clear misreading of the 
United States’ policy. While the United States had by then allowed Japan access to its records 
of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), its own trial records remained 
closed as per the 1963 directive. Despite the inaccurate premise, Booker’s suggestion to 
reconsider Australia’s approach was adopted.  
 A draft briefing memorandum was prepared for the Minister for External Affairs, Paul 
Hasluck, which provided the background of the 1955, 1959 and 1965 requests and advised that 
as ‘twenty years have now passed since the end of the war it is considered that a completely 
negative attitude to the Japanese request is anachronistic and that we might modify our 
attitude’.50 The draft memorandum conceded, accurately, that the United States had only made 
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publicly available the records of the IMTFE but argued that that there was ‘no real argument 
against enlarging the permission’ to include national records. It recommended to the Minister 
that Japan be granted access to Australia’s records.51  
 Before Hasluck was given the briefing memorandum, External Affairs sought further 
information from the United States. This time, the State Department was slightly more 
revealing about the reasons for its historical reluctance to release the records. The State 
Department told the Australian Embassy that all the records had been ‘bundled together in 
Army warehouses’ and that the ‘initial U.S. reluctance to release’ the records arose from the 
‘physical problem of sorting the material’.52 Then, about 1956, the ‘records were handed over 
to the archivists’ and it was ‘feared’ that ‘some of the material inadvertently found its way into 
the hands of research scholars’.53 This fear had prompted a discussion about access restrictions 
and had led to the decision that the records should not be released to Japan unless the other 
Allied nations were similarly prepared to acquiesce, which they were not. This was the policy 
still being observed in 1965. The State Department was, however, now tending to ‘discount 
any possibility that the Japanese are attempting to “whitewash” criminals at this point of 
history’. Rather, the State Department assumed that ‘some obscure [Japanese] historical section 
has discovered gaps in its files and succeeded in having its request processed by the Foreign 
Ministry’.54  
 Australia’s decision on Japan’s request was still being considered in early 1966 when 
it was proposed that, subject widespread agreement, copies of the trial decisions should be 
offered to Japan.55 Acting Legal Advisor Patrick Brazil recommended that as George 
Dickinson – who had been the defence advisory officer at the Manus Island trials in 1950-51 – 
had praised in print the ‘ability and fairness’ of President Kenneth Townley, who presided over 
the Manus Island trials,56 it might be worth considering that:  
 
if judgments are to be made available, they should be limited, at this stage at least, to the 
judgments given in the Manus Island trials. This course would have the advantage of 
limiting the work involved in sorting out the records and would also mean that we could 
reasonably be confident as to the quality of the jurisprudence that we were putting before 
the eyes of our Japanese friends.57  
  
External Affairs thus suggested to the Army that departmental officers examine the Manus 
Island decisions to determine whether their ‘contents would cause difficulties if made available 
to the Japanese authorities’.58 What this process revealed, however, was that External Affairs 
was completely unaware of the fact that the trials had no written decisions that could be 
provided. Even the Army, which had run the trials, now appeared unaware of this crucial fact, 
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as it did not correct External Affair’s impression but simply said that the decision was 
‘properly’ one’ for External Affairs.59 External Affairs thus remained under the impression 
throughout the remainder of 1966 that the Army was busily engaged in reviewing the (non-
existent) decisions from the Manus Island trials. Booker was told in August 1966, for example, 
that despite several reminders to the Army, External Affairs was ‘waiting for Army to examine 
the judgments [sic]’.60  
External Affairs must have finally realised its misapprehension about the existence of 
written decisions, as a review of the trial proceedings commenced. Lyndel Prott of the Legal 
and Treaties Branch observed in her April 1967 report that the trials were ‘generally 
satisfactory’ and did not cause ‘any substantial miscarriage of justice’. However, she pointed 
out that: 
 
[s]ince war crimes trials are a controversial issue in general, they provide material for a 
troublemaker to use against the country which conducted them […] Almost all of the trials 
of ‘B’ and ‘C’ class criminals have elements appearing on the face of the records which 
would provide a hostile reader with anti-Australian ammunition.61  
 
Prott concluded that Australia should ‘be wary of providing adverse propaganda against 
ourselves’ but pointed out that a refusal to grant access to the trials ‘might imply that we have 
something to hide’.62 Afterwards, Prott studied reports on the American, British, Dutch, French 
and Chinese war crimes trials and observed that ‘at least some’ of our trials could ‘raise no 
more criticism than that which has already been thoroughly discussed’ and that any impact 
could be ‘diminished’ by the fact that criticism could be levelled widely. In any event, she 
thought that it was possible to select certain trials for provision to Japan that were defensible 
against criticism.63  
By this stage, a clearer division had appeared within External Affairs as to whether the 
Japanese request should be granted. The department’s East Asia Branch, for instance, felt that 
Australia’s agreement would further relations with Japan but the Legal and Treaties Branch 
was opposed. Two draft briefing memoranda that presented lists of ‘considerations’ against 
and for the release of Australia’s trial records, noticeably so in that specific order, were 
prepared. The considerations against release in the first draft were:  
 
(i) hostile consideration of these records by the Japanese could lead to criticism of the trials 
and create unpleasant propaganda if made public; 
(ii) a future government may attempt to repudiate these trials (although the present 
government says it has no intention of doing so); 
(iii) their study would draw attention to provisions of the War Crimes Act which would be 
better left in their present happy state of neglect;  
(iv) once the records were transferred we would have no further control over their use or 
future disposal by the Japanese; 
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(v) the release of certain cases or of certain parts of proceedings only may incite the 
Japanese to further demands; 
(vi) in the absence of judgments the trial records of little value for research [sic].64  
 
The considerations promoting release generally revolved around being ‘obliging’ to the 
Japanese Government, with whom relations were ‘likely to become of increasing importance’ 
or avoiding the suggestion that Australia had something to hide or that Australia distrusted 
Japan or its motives.65 The second draft memorandum was more vehemently against releasing 
the records. It pointed out that as redeeming Japan’s reputation was presumably part of the 
overall goal, ‘critical attention’ would necessarily be focused on ‘debateable aspects’ of the 
trials.66  
 External Affairs consulted again with the Australian Embassy in Tokyo. Counsellor R.J. 
Percival responded that he thought that the undertakings provided by Ministry of Justice about 
how the records would be used should not be taken ‘seriously’. He pointed out:  
 
If at some future date the Japanese authorities wish to repudiate any or all of the war crimes 
trials, question any particular sentences, criticise the conduct of the trials, or take any similar 
action, we can be fairly sure that they will not let any previous undertakings of this sort 
stand in their way.67  
   
He conceded that, at this point, he saw ‘little gain’ for the Japanese Government in doing so. 
On the other side, Percival pointed out that it would not help Australia’s relations with Japan 
to be ‘the only government to hold out on this matter’ or for Japan to become aware that, ‘but 
for our opposition’, other Allied nations would have provided their records. He also thought 
that refusing the request would suggest that Australia had something to hide and that this would 
be ‘evidence that a strong element of distrust and antipathy remains in Australia’s attitude 
towards Japan’. In his opinion, Japan would ‘keep at us for the release of these records until 
such time as we agree to their transfer’. He suggested, therefore, that Australia release its 
records, provided the other Allied nations also agreed to do so.68    
 After further consultation with the other Allied Powers, another draft briefing 
memorandum was prepared for the Minister for External Affairs in July 1968. The Minister 
was asked to approve the records’ release upon the release by the United States of its records.69 
When consulted, the Army now indicated that there was ‘no reason’ why the Australian records 
could not be ‘perused’ by Japan, apart from those of two particular trials which it identified. In 
those two trials, the Judge-Advocate General (JAG) had advised not to confirm the findings 
but his advice had been disregarded.70 The Army pointed out, however, that JAG’s reports were 
‘never included’ when transcripts of courts-martials were made available, as they were 
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regarded as ‘confidential and privileged’.71 The Attorney-General’s Department then agreed in 
principle to release the trial proceedings to Japan, subject to the JAG’s reports being withheld.72 
 External Affairs thus recommended to the Minister that, subject to the concurrence of the 
Minister of Defence, the trial proceedings (apart from the JAG’s reports) be approved for 
release in parallel with the release of the United States’ records.73 Yet, in response Hasluck 
raised a crucial issue of parity: should Australia release the records to Japan ‘for the use of 
scholars’, as Japan had proposed, without ‘facing up’ to the issue of releasing them to 
Australian scholars?74 Booker advised Hasluck that the records had been withheld from 
Australian scholars on the ‘grounds that information they might derive from them could come 
into the hands of the Japanese to whom the records have been barred’. Booker’s reasoning 
might have been constructed on the spot, as External Affairs had told the State Department 
only the previous year that there was ‘no record of any interest ever being expressed by 
scholars’ in the Australian trial records.75 This lack is not really surprising, as scholars would 
have been unlikely to have directed requests for access to External Affairs, given that the 
records had been created by the Army and, once archived in the Commonwealth Archives 
Office, were controlled by the Attorney-General’s Department. Certainly political scientist and 
historian David Sissons, who had served as an interpreter at the Rabaul trials, had been seeking 
access to various war crimes records since the early 1950s but his queries were directed, for 
example, to the War Memorial.76 Regardless, Booker suggested to Hasluck that if the records 
were released to Japanese scholars, they should ‘also be made available to bona fide Australian 
scholars’.77 In support, he pointed out that if Japanese scholars ‘distorted or otherwise misused 
the records, their interpretations would be open to comparison with the judgments of Australian 
scholars’.78 Hasluck eventually approved the recommendation to release the records, subject to 
the proviso that the release go no further, as ‘we have to keep in step with the Allies as much 
as we can and not get ahead of them’.79  
 Although Australia had finally, after three years, made a decision on the Japanese request, 
the process of consultation continued without any communication of that decision to Japan. 
Various concurrences to releasing the records were still required, including those of the United 
States and the United Kingdom. In the interim, there were other practicalities to address, 
including whether a ministerial or other committee had to approve the release, given that it was 
a ‘sort of archives policy matter’.80 Whether all the records were in existence and accessible, 
how to offer Japan access and the costs of doing so also had to be ascertained. It was also 
suggested that the Returned Services League and the Australian War Memorial be ‘sound[ed] 
out’ on the release in case of ‘any political backlash from old soldiers’.81   
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 All of this background process was presumably underway when the issue of access to the 
trial records was finalised publicised in mid-1969. Jack Sue, a former member of Z Special 
Force on Borneo, asked the Army for access to the trials which dealt with the Sandakan-Ranau 
‘death’ marches to complete his book.82 Making the Australian Government appear as if it was 
being churlish to a veteran, a Canberra Times story alleged that Sue had been given 
‘unqualified refusals’ to access the files for 17 years, which had delayed publication of his book 
since 1952.83 At this point, External Affairs had not yet determined how to decide whether any 
applicant for access was a ‘bona fide’ scholar but it advised that it had no objection to Sue 
perusing the records, provided that ‘no reference’ was made in the book to ‘the records as such 
or to the fact that he has been given access to them’. This condition was imposed because no 
international concurrence to the release of records had yet been received.84  
 Amply displaying the problem with consultative and consensus decision-making 
involving multiple stakeholders, and the apparent imperative for Australian policy to neither 
get ahead nor behind other nations, any momentum on releasing the records then appeared to 
grind to a halt. Australia never received any official indication from the United Kingdom 
whether it would agree to release the records. As a memorandum in 1975 pointed out, External 
Affairs last had heard from the United Kingdom on the issue in September 1969.85 As a result, 
no decision had been apparently communicated to Japan on its 1965 request and nor had any 
further requests from Japan been presented when, in 1975, the issue finally became moot. 
Opening the Trials 
The decision to finally release the Australian trial proceedings to public access in 1975 appears 
to have been prompted not by Japan – which sensibly might have given up asking by then – 
but by Australian scholars such as Sissons pressing the Attorney-General’s Department for 
access. Fortunately, at least as far as the Attorney-General’s Department was concerned, some 
transition had taken place in how the records were viewed. In announcing his decision to lift 
the access restrictions, the Attorney-General, Keppel Enderby QC, pointed out, in fact, that he 
did not regard the trial proceedings as ‘government records’, as the ‘conduct of these trials did 
not form a part of the normal administration’ of government.86 This meant that the standard 30-
year closed period then in force for archives – which would run until the early 1980s – did not 
apply. More crucially, Enderby remarked:  
                            
The Australian Government recognises the need of this and future generations of 
Australians to question and understand this country’s past … For too long Australian 
scholars have been hampered in their attempts to interpret Australia’s history. Restrictions 
like this one no longer serve a useful purpose. They should be replaced by a policy based 
on open access wherever practicable. The past should be everyone’s property.87     
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Given the general trend in the early 1970s to appreciate the value of government records to 
national history, and that other World War II-era records had been opened in 1971, the decision 
to make the trial proceedings accessible was probably not surprising. However, this decision 
may never have been made if the Attorney-General’s Department had not acted without 
consultation with the Department of Foreign Affairs, as it now was. Presented with a fait 
accompli, Foreign Affairs complained about this ‘unwelcome surprise’, especially as it came 
on the eve of a ministerial visit to Japan.88 Foreign Affairs alleged that there were ‘political 
considerations which, even after the passage of many years, remain strong’ and argued that the 
United Kingdom should have been consulted as a matter of ‘courtesy’.89 This reads as oddly 
deferential to the United Kingdom, given that there was no mention of consultation with the 
United States, which earlier had been of equal importance. Fortunately for historians, 
international consultation did not further delay the release of the records. Yet, clearly miffed at 
the Attorney General’s trespass on what it considered to its patch of responsibility, Foreign 
Affairs sought an undertaking that, in the future, its concurrence should be sought before the 
Attorney-General’s Department released ‘historical records affecting other countries’.90  
It took close to a quarter of a century after the end of the Australian trials in 1951 for 
the Australian Government to finally make the trial proceedings publicly accessible. In the 
interim, most Australian trial participants had died, taking with them their invaluable personal 
accounts. Yet, even if Australia had granted any one of the Japanese requests in the 1950s and 
1960s for access to the trial proceedings, any records which Australia provided to Japan would 
have been restricted from public access in Japan for another quarter century. It was not until 
1999 that the Allied war crimes trials records gathered by the Ministry of Justice’s Judiciary 
and Legislation Investigation Bureau were transferred to the National Archives of Japan, 
Tokyo, and made (mostly) accessible to the public.91 Fortunately for researchers, Japanese 
participants in the trials have left considerably more personal accounts in writing of their 
experiences as the Australian trials.      
 Today, the Australian trial proceedings are digitised in full at the National Archives of 
Australia,92 as are many other war crimes files. Fortunately, somewhere along the way 
Australia discarded the imperative not to ‘get ahead’ of other Allied nations: Australia is, in 
fact, the only Allied nation thus far to disclose all its World War II war crimes trial proceedings 
online. Any researcher in the world can now access the trial proceedings and efforts to make 
public comprehensive finding aids to the investigation and trial records are ongoing. While 
Australia has by its promotion of digitisation perhaps partially remedied the restrictions it 
placed for decades on historical research into the trials, the impact of the delay, and particularly 
the loss of valuable firsthand accounts of the trials, can never be overcome.   
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